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 To What End the Dialogue? 
E. Ria Tzimas* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The jurisprudence on Aboriginal-Crown relations, reconciliation and 
the operation of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 19821 remains in its 
early stages of development. In 2004 and 2005, the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decisions on Aboriginal consultation2 set in motion some 
profound changes in Aboriginal-Crown interactions and relations. With 
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)3 figuring most 
prominently in the legal discourse, the legal cases that began to emerge 
across the country pushed out the limits of consultation on a range of 
questions: who, what, when, why and how to go about Aboriginal 
consultation. Underlying those questions were genuine concerns over 
what the Aboriginal-Crown relationship is to look like and how to 
achieve an efficient meaningful balance. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada had three opportunities to 
clarify and enrich its vision of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 to 
add greater texture to the duty to consult, and to position section 35 in 
the broader discourse of Crown-Aboriginal relations. Those three 
opportunities were offered in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Moses,4 Rio 
Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council5 and Beckman v. Little 
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation.6 In the result, the Court confirmed that 
reconciliation and the honour of the Crown are the two operative and 
                                                                                                             
*  Ria Tzimas is counsel at Crown Law Office Civil, Ministry of the Attorney General of 
Ontario, and practises Aboriginal law. She is also Adjunct Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. 
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent the views of the 
Government of Ontario. 
1  Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2  Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 
S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida Nation”]; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British 
Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Taku River”]; and Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian 
Heritage), [2005] S.C.J. No. 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mikisew Cree”]. 
3  Haida Nation, id. 
4  [2010] S.C.J. No. 17, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 557 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moses”]. 
5  [2010] S.C.J. No. 43, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rio Tinto”]. 
6  [2010] S.C.J. No. 53, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Salmon”]. 
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guiding principles of Crown-Aboriginal relations. All three cases 
endorsed the proposition that, as Binnie J. stated in Little Salmon, the 
“grand purpose of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” is “[t]he recon-
ciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians in a mutually 
respectful long-term relationship.”7 By extension, the Court expressly 
confirmed the duty to consult as the primary legal and constitutional 
vehicle to be used to achieve reconciliation. On that articulation, the 
Crown has the obligation to engage in dialogue that will “foster a 
positive long-term relationship”.8 Aboriginal claimants have the obliga-
tion to ensure that the claims and assertions they advance are credible. In 
other words, a claim must be one that “actually exists and stands to be 
affected by a proposed government action”.9 These anchoring principles 
underscored the Court’s orientation as it relates to what it sees as the long-
term objective of reconciliation, namely, to foster the ability of Aboriginal 
communities to participate within the mainstream legal system “with its 
advantages of continuity, transparency, and predictability”.10 
How reconciliation is to be effected and what the relationship be-
tween modern treaties, the existing division of powers and section 35 
rights ought to look like, surfaced in these decisions as questions that 
will require further debate and consideration. Beginning in Moses and 
continuing in Little Salmon, the emerging dialogue between Binnie J. and 
Deschamps J. revealed some significant differences over how the 
outcomes of renewed relationships, as reflected in modern day agree-
ments and treaties, might be interpreted, applied and understood within 
the context of the broader constitutional fabric.  
Writing for the majority in both cases, Binnie J. explained that mod-
ern-day agreements exist within a special constitutional relationship. 
That symbiosis means that where the implementation of modern day 
agreements results in conflicting consultation practices or requirements, 
the Constitution holds the ultimate checks and balances and governs the 
resolution of such conflict. Consistent with that perspective, in Moses, 
Binnie J. framed the issue in dispute in terms of a federal/provincial 
jurisdictional divide and pursued his analysis on that basis. In doing so 
he discounted the consultation and participatory procedures in the James 
Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, 1975, (“JBNQA”), in favour of 
what he saw as a better complementary section 35 consultation process. 
                                                                                                             
7  Id., at para. 10. 
8  Id. 
9  Rio Tinto, supra, note 5, at para. 41. 
10  Little Salmon, supra, note 6, at para. 12. 
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Similarly, in Little Salmon, where the issue related to the adequacy of 
consultation terms within a modern-day agreement, Binnie J. concluded 
that section 35 consultation obligations existing outside of the agreement 
would resolve the impasse. An acceptable resolution would be one that 
fell within a range of reasonable outcomes, without undermining the 
existing constitutional framework.11 Such an approach would also pave 
the way for reconciliation.  
By contrast, Deschamps J.’s point of departure was that modern-day 
agreements are manifestations of renewed or reconciled relationships. As 
renewed relationships, they are intended to give expression to an Abo-
riginal community’s special constitutional rights and its autonomy of 
judgment. They are also the product of negotiations among Aboriginal 
communities, a province and the federal government. That negotiation 
process is infused with honour of the Crown principles. The new ways of 
the relationship, as mutually negotiated by the Crown and the subject 
Aboriginal community, ought to therefore serve as the primary source for 
a solution to an alleged impasse. With the exception of true gaps in such 
agreements, resorting to an additional layer of consultation, even if that 
is a section 35 process, as in the case of Little Salmon or, shifting 
jurisdictions, as in the case of Moses, would run the serious risk of 
stifling the very reconciliation that the parties were trying to reach 
through such agreements. Justice Deschamps went so far as to suggest 
that the superimposition of parallel consultation processes would run the 
risk of “paternalistic legal contempt” of the treaty-making process and, 
by extension, the goal of reconciliation.12 
The contrast in approaches between Binnie J. and Deschamps J., 
combined with the comments by McLachlin C.J.C. in Rio Tinto, raised 
critical questions about what reconciliation is supposed to look like and 
what the consultation dialogue is supposed to accomplish. Is dialogue 
through consultations and modern treaty negotiations intended to make 
some room for Aboriginal participation in the overall socio-economic 
growth and well-being of the country? Or, is reconciliation intended to 
enable a more profound reshaping of the Crown-Aboriginal relationship? 
Stated differently, how is the grand purpose of section 35 to be actual-
ized? Arguably, some clarity in the overall direction of the relationship is 
essential to answering the range of practical “who, what, where, when 
                                                                                                             
11  Id., at para. 48. 
12  Id., at paras. 103-107. 
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and why” questions that are being canvassed and tested almost daily 
across the country in negotiations and litigation. 
The discussion that follows seeks to analyze these questions with 
reference to the three latest decisions. To that end, the analysis is divided 
into three parts. The first part of the discussion is intended to acquaint the 
reader with the key facts and legal conclusions of each of the three cases. 
The section is fairly lengthy, as it seeks to uncover and illustrate the 
complexities and the depth of the issues that underpin the journey to 
reconciliation. The second part analyzes the implications that flow from 
the way that the Court describes the duty to consult and reconciliation. 
That discussion sets up the third part, which seeks to place the emerging 
debate in Moses and in Little Salmon in the broader discourse of what 
reconciliation is to look like.  
II. THE 2010 CONSULTATION CASES 
1. Rio Tinto 
It is useful to begin with a review of Rio Tinto because of the three 
cases, it is the one that most comprehensively picks up the consultation 
jurisprudence from Haida Nation and expands on the elements of the 
duty to consult, including its parameters and content. Since the Court 
unanimously views consultation as the primary vehicle for reconciliation 
it is crucial to understand the depth and the governing principles of 
consultation. Those governing principles anchor the dialogue in both 
Moses and Little Salmon.  
(a)  Background Facts 
The Court’s consideration of the parameters of the duty to consult 
unfolded in the context of determining whether and to what extent the 
B.C. Utilities Commission had consultation obligations in connection 
with the approval of an Energy Purchase Agreement (“EPA”) between 
Rio Tinto Alcan and BC Hydro. The facts had their roots in the 1950s 
when Alcan (now Rio Tinto Alcan), constructed a dam on the Nechako 
River, in Northwestern British Columbia. The project diverted water 
from the Nechako River into the Nechako reservoir, where a powerhouse 
produced electricity to support the operation of Alcan’s Kitimat alumi-
num smelter. The water then flowed to the Kemano River and on to the 
Pacific Ocean. The Carrier Sekani Tribal Council First Nations 
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(“CSTC”) claim the Nechako Valley as their ancestral homeland and 
assert Aboriginal rights and title to that area. They also assert a right to 
harvest salmon from the Nechako River. CSTC First Nations were not 
consulted when the dam was built, even though the dam affected the 
exercise of their rights.  
Since 1961, Alcan has been selling its surplus power to BC Hydro 
through a series of successive power sale agreements. The 2007 EPA, 
whose approval was the subject of this case, was the latest of those 
agreements. It had to be reviewed by the Utilities Commission to 
determine whether the terms of the agreement were in the public interest.  
The CSTC took the position that BC Hydro had consultation obliga-
tions prior to entering into the 2007 EPA because that agreement had the 
effect of perpetuating the pre-existing negative effects of the Alcan dam 
on its Aboriginal rights. In response, the Commission concluded that no 
consultation obligations were triggered because the approval of the 
Agreement would not affect the water levels in the Nechako River. 
Whether Alcan were to sell the power to BC Hydro or not, Alcan would 
operate the dam in the same manner. The selling of the excess power 
would not result in any new adverse effects on the CSTC First Nations’ 
rights. The Commission, therefore approved the 2007 EPA. 
The CSTC appealed the decision of the Commission to the B.C. 
Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal concluded unanimously that the 
Commission ought to reconsider its decision to approve on the grounds 
that the Commission erred in two materials ways: (1) the Commission 
should not have dismissed the consultation issue at its preliminary stage 
of deliberations over the 2007 EPA; and (2) the Commission should not 
have concluded that there was no issue of consultation merely because 
there would be no new physical impact on the rights of the CSTC First 
Nations. Instead, the Court of Appeal concluded that the Commission 
ought to hold a full evidentiary hearing specifically on the matter of 
consultation.13 The Commission appealed the decision to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. 
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal unanimously and 
restored the Commission’s decision. In doing so, the Court explored the 
subject of the duty to consult in terms of two broad themes: (1) the content 
and parameters of the duty to consult; and (2) the role of tribunals.  
                                                                                                             
13 [2009] B.C.J. No. 259, 2009 BCCA 67, 89 B.C.L.R. (4th) 298 (B.C.C.A.). 
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(b)  Legal Analysis 
(i)  The Duty to Consult 
Writing for the Court, McLachlin C.J.C. began the analysis by reiter-
ating the stipulation in Haida Nation14 that the duty to consult arises 
when three elements exist: (1) the Crown’s knowledge, actual or con-
structive, of a potential Aboriginal claim or right; (2) contemplated 
Crown conduct; and (3) the potential that the contemplated conduct may 
adversely affect an Aboriginal claim or right.15  
With respect to the first test, “[a]ctual knowledge arises when a claim 
has been filed in court or advanced in the context of negotiations, or 
when a treaty right might be impacted.”16 By contrast, “[c]onstructive 
knowledge arises when lands are known or reasonably suspected to have 
been traditionally occupied by an Aboriginal community or an impact on 
rights may reasonably be anticipated.”17 From an Aboriginal claimant’s 
perspective, the claim or right must be one that “actually exists and 
stands to be affected by the proposed government action”.18 
On the subject of Crown conduct, the duty to consult is not limited to 
statutory obligations. Nor is it limited to decisions that go to immediate 
impacts on lands and resources but rather, extends to “strategic, higher-
level decisions” in instances where such decisions “may set the stage for 
further decisions that will have a direct adverse impact on lands or 
resources”.19 The threshold is relatively low, in that the potential for 
adverse impact suffices for consultation obligations to be engaged.  
The third component of the test, going to the issue of “adverse im-
pact”, is perhaps the most important binding ingredient to consultation 
jurisprudence. Chief Justice McLachlin explained that an essential 
component of the duty to consult is the question of whether there is a 
causal relationship between the proposed government action and its 
potential of jeopardizing an asserted or an existing right. The overriding 
objective is to protect and preserve Aboriginal rights and claims pending 
their resolution. However, absent the jeopardy of asserted or existing 
rights, the duty to consult is not engaged. In the same vein, consultation 
is not triggered where there is an underlying or continuing breach from 
                                                                                                             
14  Haida Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 35. 
15  Rio Tinto, supra, note 5, at para. 31. 
16  Id., at para. 40. 
17  Id. 
18  Id., at para. 41. 
19  Id., at paras. 44-47 (emphasis in original). 
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the past. If there has been damage to a section 35 right, such damage is 
done. The Court acknowledged that such instances could attract remedies 
but they would not operate to require retrospective consultation. The 
exception to that proposition would be instances in which the prior and 
continuing breach caused new adverse impact(s) on a present claim or an 
existing right.20  
Finally, the Court rejected an open-ended definition of an adverse 
impact. Chief Justice McLachlin explained that if the consultation were 
“cut off from its roots in the need to preserve Aboriginal interests”21 there 
would be a risk that one side would gain an advantage over the other. 
Similarly, although in other parts of the decision government strategic 
decision-making was identified as an example of a government action 
that could trigger consultation obligations, the Court seemed to limit the 
consideration of the adequacy of consultation to a “current decision”.22 It 
expressly rejected the notion that consultation obligations could be used 
as a “hook” to tie down the duty to consult over the entire resource.23 The 
adverse impacts would have to relate to a specific Crown proposal and 
not larger adverse impacts of the project. One example of a strategic 
decision that might raise a consultation obligation that was offered by the 
Court concerned the privatization of a Crown resource because such a 
decision would “affect the Crown’s future ability to deal honourably with 
Aboriginal interests”.24 
Taking these observations together, the Court concluded that the ap-
proval of the EPA 2007 did not trigger a duty to consult because nothing 
would change on the ground with respect to additional infringements of 
the CSTC First Nations’ section 35 rights. 
(ii)  The Role of Tribunals 
Having explained the instances when consultation obligations would 
be triggered, the Court then considered the role of tribunals in the 
consultation jurisprudence. It concluded that the role of any particular 
tribunal as it concerns consultation obligations would depend on the 
duties and powers conferred upon it by the legislature.25 Building on 
                                                                                                             
20  Id., at para. 49. 
21  Id., at para. 50. 
22  Id., at para. 53. 
23  Id., at paras. 52-54. 
24  Id., at paras. 90, 47. 
25  Id., at para. 55. 
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Haida Nation, McLachlin C.J.C. made the further observation that the 
legislature could choose to delegate to a tribunal the Crown’s duty to 
consult and that it would also be open to governments to set up regula-
tory schemes to address the procedural requirements of consultation at 
different stages of the decision-making process concerning a resource.26 
Alternatively, the legislature could choose to confine a tribunal’s power 
to determinations over the adequacy of the consultation as a condition of 
its statutory decision-making process. In such an instance the tribunal 
would be evaluating the Crown’s conduct to determine whether the duty 
to consult was appropriately discharged.27 The Court also drew a distinc-
tion between a tribunal’s power to engage in consultations and the 
jurisdiction to determine whether a duty to consult existed at all. Signifi-
cantly, the Court observed that the act of consultation in and of itself is 
not a question of law. Rather, it is a distinct and often complex process 
involving the consideration of facts, law, policy and compromise.28 A 
tribunal would have to be given express jurisdiction through its enabling 
statute to engage with facts, law, policy and also to facilitate a compro-
mise. Similarly, even for specialized tribunals with the expertise and 
authority to decide questions of law, the relevant statutes governing their 
operation and jurisdiction would have to be examined to ensure that the 
legislature did not exclude the ability to consider such questions from the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction.  
With these considerations in mind, the Court concluded that the 
Commission in this case lacked the jurisdiction to engage in consulta-
tions. Furthermore, it did not have the authority to rescope the order to 
address consultation. However, since the Administrative Tribunals Act29 
and the Constitutional Question Act30 did not expressly exclude from the 
Commission’s jurisdiction the duty to consider the adequacy of Crown 
consultation, that issue was properly before it.31 
2.  Moses 
Moses is the first case in the Aboriginal jurisprudence to consider the 
relationship between a modern treaty and the jurisdictional divide 
                                                                                                             
26  Id., at para. 56. 
27  Id., at para. 57. 
28  Id., at para. 60. 
29  S.B.C. 2004, c. 45. 
30  R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 47. 
31  Rio Tinto, supra, note 5, at para. 72. 
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between federal and provincial powers as defined in sections 91 and 92 
of the Constitution Act, 1867,32 treaty obligations and the honour of the 
Crown. The project that became the subject of the appeal was a proposed 
vanadium mine at Lac Doré, near Chibougamau, Quebec. That area is 
within the territory covered by the JBNQA, which covers an area of 
410,000 square miles of land and lakes.  
(a)  The Consultation Regime Within the JBNQA 
The JBNQA, and in particular section 22, contains a complex gov-
ernance scheme and a consultative framework for activities on the treaty 
lands.33 To begin with, it provides for an Advisory Committee that is 
responsible for reviewing and overseeing the administration and man-
agement of the environmental and social regime provided for by the 
JBNQA. That Committee includes representatives from Canada, Quebec 
and the Cree.  
A proponent of a project begins the review process by submitting 
preliminary information to an Administrator. The identity of the Admin-
istrator depends on which government has jurisdiction over the project. 
The Administrator then sends the information to an Evaluating Commit-
tee. That Committee studies the information and then makes recommen-
dations over the proper scope of an environmental assessment. The 
Committee’s analysis returns to the Administrator, who may then give 
instructions or make recommendations to the proponent about the nature 
and content of the environmental assessment.  
Next, the proponent must prepare an impact statement that specifi-
cally speaks to the anticipated impacts on the Cree communities. That 
statement moves from the Administrator, to a Review Body, and then to 
the Cree Regional Authority, which in turn may make its representations 
back to the Review Body. The Review Body then conducts the assess-
                                                                                                             
32  (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.  
33  As a general observation, the JBNQA is very comprehensive in character and arguably 
was well ahead of its time in terms of the kind of relationship and interaction across governments 
and the Cree of Quebec on how to achieve reconciliation. Although there were a number of lawsuits 
that arose out of various aspects of the JBNQA, that does not diminish its pioneering dimensions. 
Justice Binnie discussed this briefly in Moses, supra, note 4, at para. 14, where he noted that the 
JBNQA “was an epic achievement in the ongoing effort to reconcile the rights and interests of 
Aboriginal peoples and those of non-Aboriginal peoples in Northern Quebec”. Similarly, Deschamps 
J. described it as a model for the many modern land treaties that have been signed since the 1982 
constitutional amendments (id., at para. 82). In addition to the powers of self-government over large 
segments of the JBNQA territory, Deschamps J. also placed significant emphasis on the Agree-
ment’s intergovernmental provisions as between Canada and Quebec (id., at para. 84).  
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ment and has the ultimate responsibility of determining whether the 
project may proceed and, if so, on what terms and conditions.34 The 
membership of the Review Body is determined on the basis of which 
government has jurisdiction over the project. In either instance there is 
participation by the Cree Regional Authority. Thus, if a project falls 
within provincial jurisdiction, the Review Body will consist of provincial 
representatives, and representatives of the Cree Regional Authority. If the 
project falls within federal jurisdiction, then the representatives on the 
Review Body will be from the federal government, together with 
representatives of the Cree Regional Authority.  
Constitutional jurisdiction over the project also determines whether or 
not a proposed project must undergo more than one assessment. The 
JBNQA provides that a project ought not to be submitted to more than one 
assessment unless it falls within both provincial and federal jurisdiction. 
When the latter is the case, the parties, by mutual agreement, may conduct 
only one assessment. As for the determination of jurisdiction, the JBNQA 
provides for an Evaluating Committee to study the project and to make a 
recommendation to the provincial Treaty Administrator. The Treaty 
Administrator then submits the recommendation to the provincial cabinet, 
which has the discretion to either accept or reject the recommendation.  
Apart from how the JBNQA is to operate, the other significant ele-
ment of the JBNQA is the requirement that Canada and Quebec, in their 
adopting legislation of the JBNQA, expressly recognize that neither 
government “will impair the substance of the rights, undertakings and 
obligations provided for in the Agreement”.35 This commitment was 
further reinforced by the term in the JBNQA that recognized that 
inconsistencies between the legislation adopting the JBNQA and the 
provisions of “any other federal or provincial law” would be resolved in 
favour of the terms of the JBNQA.36  
(b)  The Moses Project 
The proposed mine was said to contain 10 million tons of vanadium 
and would have an anticipated life of 40 years. In practical terms, the 
measurements were said to correspond to 12 per cent of the worldwide 
vanadium consumption, with the proposed project being the only one of 
                                                                                                             
34  Moses, id., at paras. 127-129. 
35  Id., at para. 88. 
36  Id., at para. 89. 
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its kind in North America.37 From the perspective of impacts, the 
proposed project would involve disruptions to watercourses and lakes in 
the area and the construction of tailing ponds, all of which would have 
harmful effects on fish habitat. Apart from the anticipated impacts on the 
fish, all parties agreed that the proposed project fell under provincial 
jurisdiction. The potential impacts on fish and fish habitats, however, 
brought in federal jurisdiction and the question of whether or not a 
comprehensive assessment would be required by the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans (“DFO”), in accordance with the requirements of 
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.38 
Before the process under the JBNQA was completed, the federal of-
ficials advised the Cree that the assessment of the project would be 
undertaken by a review panel under the CEAA and not through the 
federal assessment procedure anticipated by the JBNQA. In response, the 
Cree commenced an action in Quebec Superior Court, seeking a declara-
tion that (1) the CEAA was inapplicable in the territory covered by the 
JBNQA because it was inconsistent with the JBNQA; and (2) federal and 
provincial environmental assessments should be conducted in accordance 
with the terms of the JBNQA, given the nature and impact of the project. 
In response, Quebec argued that the project was essentially within 
provincial jurisdiction such that only its environmental assessment ought 
to be applied. Canada responded that the concern with the fish and 
fisheries resulted in a requirement for two environmental reviews, one 
under the terms of the JBNQA, and the other under the CEAA. 
(c)  The Decision of the Lower Courts 
The Quebec Superior Court concluded that only the provincial  
process was applicable to the project. The Quebec Court of Appeal 
disagreed. It analyzed the problem in terms of three questions: (1) the 
validity of the CEAA; (2) inconsistencies between the CEAA and the 
JBNQA; and (3) whether there could be two assessments. The Court 
concluded that although the CEAA was valid, the JBNQA was para-
mount to the CEAA and its terms would prevail. The Court also con-
cluded that in the event of any inconsistencies under the terms of the 
JBNQA’s review process, the federal Review Body would prevail. That 
conclusion left the Supreme Court of Canada with the formidable task of 
                                                                                                             
37  Id., at para. 64. 
38  S.C. 1992, c. 37 [hereinafter “CEAA”]. 
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having to determine which of the environmental assessment paths would 
be most appropriate to the circumstances of the case, and which would 
respond to the protection and reconciliation of section 35 rights.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, members of the Court had two distinct 
views of the complexity of the processes. The Court divided 5-4 in the 
outcome. At the heart of the difference between the majority and minor-
ity views was a fundamentally different methodology and approach to 
the relationship of modern-day agreements and the broader constitutional 
fabric.  
(d)  The Majority Decision 
Writing for the majority, Binnie J. approached the analysis by focusing 
on the various pieces of the jurisdictional puzzle. The overriding concern 
appears to have been to preserve federal paramountcy in the assessment of 
the vanadium project. Justice Binnie acknowledged that the JBNQA 
reflected a lengthy and precise arrangement among parties of equal 
sophistication that ought to be interpreted in accordance with the principles 
of contract interpretation. He contrasted modern-day comprehensive 
treaties between the Crown and Aboriginal communities with historic 
treaties in which gaps in the relevant treaty texts and silence on a number 
of issues required a different approach to treaty interpretation.39 But when 
it came to interpreting those parts of the JBNQA that were relevant to the 
assessment of the vanadium project, the concern shifted to the federal-
provincial divide. Even though the JBNQA had a system aimed at rational-
izing questions of jurisdiction, Binnie J. drew a bright line between the 
division of powers defined by the Constitution Act, 1867 and any other 
arrangement that might be contained in an Agreement.40  
To solve the problem in a way that both preserved the JBNQA  
process and maintained federal paramountcy, Binnie J. explained that the 
JBNQA could co-exist with the CEAA process in a complementary 
manner. Dismissing the implications that the project would be subject to 
two processes, Binnie J. concluded that the requirements of the CEAA 
would follow only if the proposed project passed JBNQA scrutiny. As 
such, the JBNQA was described as an “internal pre-approval treaty 
                                                                                                             
39  Moses, supra, note 4, at para. 7; with respect to the interpretation of historic treaties, and 
the principles of treaty interpretation, see R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 
(S.C.C.); and Mikisew Cree, supra, note 2. 
40  Moses, id., at para. 8. 
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review process”, to be followed by the CEAA’s “external post-approval 
treaty process”. The further rationalization for this approach and distinc-
tion was anchored in the view that the provincial assessment contem-
plated by the JBNQA was much less comprehensive than the 
requirements of the CEAA. Finally, Binnie J. was of the further view that 
there could be no harm in having the project reviewed pursuant to the 
CEAA, because the CEAA would then be guided by the principles of the 
honour of the Crown in the consideration of Cree concerns. In Binnie J.’s 
words, “common sense as well as legal requirements suggest that the 
CEAA assessment will be structured to accommodate the special context 
of a project proposal in the James Bay Treaty territory, including partici-
pation of the Cree”.41  
(e)  The Dissent 
Unlike the majority, Deschamps J.’s point of departure reflected her 
attempt to preserve the integrity of the JBNQA and to locate an appropri-
ate response to the assessment of the vanadium project within the 
JBNQA process. The description of the JBNQA as “both an intergov-
ernmental agreement and an Aboriginal rights agreement”42 captured the 
core of Deschamps J.’s analysis. The JBNQA granted to the Cree powers 
of self-government over large segments of Cree territory. In that vein, 
unlike the CEAA process, where Cree participation would be limited to 
section 35 consultation input, under the terms of the JBNQA, the Cree 
had a defined participatory role in the consideration and assessment of 
projects. Justice Deschamps also took note of the express recognition in 
the JBNQA43 that the rights, undertakings and obligations contained 
therein were not to be read down by or impaired by conflicting legisla-
tion. To the contrary, Deschamps J. highlighted the practice of agreeing 
to one environmental assessment process for proposed undertakings and 
projects.  
Overriding the particular features of the JBNQA and the enabling 
provincial and federal statutes was the concern that modern-day treaty 
agreements, while not nearly as obscure as the historic treaties so as to 
require specific rules of interpretation, still had to be interpreted with 
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reference to and consideration of the intentions of all parties to the 
agreement. Beginning with the text of the JBNQA, Deschamps J. 
explained that the Court had to strive “for an interpretation that is 
reasonable, yet consistent with the parties’ intentions and the overall 
context, including the legal context of the negotiations” that resulted in 
the agreement.”44 Using that view as her guide, and taking the specific 
features of the JBNQA into account, Deschamps J. concluded that the 
assessment process under the JBNQA was sufficient to meet the goal of 
reconciliation. That meant that there was no need for a CEAA process. 
Should the project pass JBNQA scrutiny, the federal Fisheries Minister 
would be obliged to accept the results of the JBNQA assessment and 
issue the requisite permit.  
3.  Little Salmon 
The treatment and interpretation of modern-day agreements that be-
gan in Moses continued in Little Salmon, though this time with reference 
to the relationship between consultation obligations contained within a 
modern-day treaty and section 35 consultation obligations. The specific 
question was whether or not a duty to consult existed in addition to the 
consultation provisions contained in the treaty between Little 
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation (“LSCFN”) and, if so, whether the Crown 
met its consultation obligations. The further question was whether, in the 
absence of consultation provisions in a modern-day agreement, section 
35 consultation obligations existed or whether the silence in the modern-
day agreement could be taken to mean that section 35 consultation 
obligations were deliberately being written out of the relationship.  
The Court was unanimous in the conclusion that the Crown met its 
consultation obligations to LSCFN. However, the judges were divided in 
their perspectives over the locus of the consultation obligations and how 
that obligation was met. The difference in approaches reflected divisions 
similar to those that surfaced in Moses. The debate over the proper 
interpretation of modern-day treaties, the positioning of section 35 
obligations and the overriding implications of the honour of the Crown 
continued between Binnie J. and Deschamps J., with Binnie J. writing for 
the majority and Deschamps J. writing for a reduced minority. 
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(a)  The Background Facts 
The modern-day treaty at issue was the Little Salmon/Carmacks First 
Nation Final Agreement (“LSCFN Treaty”), which was finalized in 1996 
and ratified by LSCFN in 1997. That treaty was one of 11 pursuant to the 
terms of an umbrella agreement among all the Yukon First Nations and 
the federal and territorial governments that was signed in 1993, follow-
ing 20 years of negotiation. The overall magnitude of the umbrella 
agreement covered an area of 484,000 square kilometres, or, in the words 
of Binnie J., an area “roughly the size of Spain”.45 The terms of the 
LSCFN Treaty were outlined in over 400 pages. The LSCFN surrendered 
41,595 square kilometres. In exchange, key features of the LSCFN 
Treaty that were relevant to this appeal included: 
• the retention of 2,589 square kilometres of “settlement land”; 
• financial compensation of over $34 million;  
• potential royalty sharing; 
• rights of access to Crown land; 
• special management areas; 
• protection of access to settlement lands;  
• rights to harvest and fish wildlife; 
• rights to harvest forest resources; and 
• rights to representation and involvement in land use planning and 
resource management.46  
The LSCFN Treaty also created self-government institutions as well as 
authorities such as the Yukon Environmental and Socioeconomic As-
sessment Board of Carmacks Renewable Resources Council. Members 
of that Board would include individuals who would be nominated jointly 
by the LSCFN and the Yukon government. Equally material to the 
unfolding of this case were two seemingly contradictory clauses in the 
treaty. The first was a fairly standard “entire agreement clause” that was 
intended to achieve certainty with respect to the relationship that was 
being created. The second was a non-derogation clause that recognized 
that nothing in the treaty arrangements would affect the ability of the 
Aboriginal people of the Yukon to exercise or benefit from “any existing 
or future constitutional rights for aboriginal people that may be applica-
ble to them”.  
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Turning to the specific facts, in 2001, a Yukon resident, Larry 
Paulsen, submitted an application for an agricultural land grant of 65 
hectares to the territorial government. Mr. Paulsen wished to grow hay, 
construct some buildings and raise livestock. The application went 
through four levels of review between 2001 and 2004. At the first level 
of review, the application was pre-screened for completeness and 
compliance with the relevant and then current government policies. The 
application was then reviewed by the Agriculture Land Application 
Review Committee, where in the result, Mr. Paulsen was asked to 
reconfigure his application to take into account concerns over the 
suitability of the soil and undefined environmental, wildlife and trapping 
issues.47  
In 2004, the application reached the third level of review, the Land 
Application Review Committee (“LARC”). There, LARC organized a 
meeting to discuss the application. It specifically invited the LSCFN to 
participate in the discussion. The LSCFN opposed the application. At the 
heart of LSCFN’s opposition was a concern for a trapline that intersected 
the lands that were the subject of Mr. Paulsen’s application. LSCFN also 
raised concerns over the loss of animals to hunt in the area, as well as the 
potential impact on adjacent heritage sites. While the LARC took these 
concerns into consideration, it did so in light of the fact that the Paulsen 
application for 65 hectares represented approximately one-third of one 
per cent of the whole trapline, which covered an area of 21,435 hectares. 
LARC ultimately concluded that any impacts on the trapline would be 
minimal and recommended that the Paulsen application be approved. 
LARC also recommended an archeological survey to address potential 
heritage and cultural sites. That study was undertaken and no adverse 
impacts were identified. The Paulsen application was approved, although 
no notice of the approval was sent to the LSCFN.  
Just over a year following the approval, LSCFN made inquiries into 
the status of the application. Upon being advised that the application had 
been approved, the LSCFN initiated an administrative appeal, followed 
by a judicial review application. In its application for judicial review, the 
LSCFN sought to have the approval quashed on the basis that the 
territorial government failed in its consultation obligations. 
Both the judge at first instance and the Yukon Court of Appeal held 
that the LSCFN Treaty did not operate to exclude a section 35 duty to 
consult. They also agreed that the obligation lay at the lower end of the 
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consultation spectrum. Where the two lower courts parted company was 
on whether or not that duty was satisfied by the territorial government. 
The reviewing judge at first instance concluded that the duty to consult 
was not satisfied. The Yukon Court of Appeal held that it was. 
(b)  Decision of Justice Binnie 
Writing for the majority, Binnie J. was guided in his analysis by the 
view that the duty to consult was a derivative of the honour of the Crown 
and therefore applied to this and all cases, independently of expressed or 
implied intentions of the parties. He expressly rejected the notion that a 
modern-day agreement could be a complete code of conduct. Character-
izing “reconciliation” of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians in a 
mutually respectful long-term relationship as the “grand purpose of 
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982”,48 Binnie J. explained that 
modern treaties “attempt to further the objective of reconciliation not 
only by addressing grievances over the land claims but by creating the 
legal basis to foster a positive long-term relationship between Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal communities”.49 He also observed that modern 
agreements were “designed to place Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
relations in the mainstream legal system with its advantages of continu-
ity, transparency, and predictability”.50 He went on, “it is up to the 
parties, when treaty issues arise, to act diligently to advance their 
respective interests”.51 Justice Binnie also observed that such agreements 
were not about preserving the status quo. In other words, they could not 
be interpreted narrowly by territorial officials so as to eclipse the con-
struction of that new relationship. The counterpoint to that assertion was 
that the LSCFN could not ignore the $34 million and other treaty benefits 
it received through the agreement. Bearing in mind the need to maintain 
a new balance in the Aboriginal-Crown relationship, the modern-day 
agreement was firmly positioned as only one, albeit significant step, “in 
the long journey of reconciliation”.52  
Coming full circle, Binnie J. then explained that consultation is 
something that is imposed on the treaty as a matter of law, “irrespective 
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of the parties’ ‘agreement’”.53 He noted that the duty to consult is not a 
collateral agreement or condition, nor would the duty to consult upset the 
interpretation or operation of the entire agreement clause. Rather, the 
duty to consult “is simply part of the essential legal framework within 
which the treaty is to be interpreted and performed”.54  
In the result, when dealing with a modern-day treaty, the first step 
would be to review the treaty to determine the parties’ respective consul-
tation obligations as articulated in the document. If the agreement 
contained a consultation process, then the scope of the obligation ought 
to be shaped by the provisions of that process. Consultation might not be 
required, if the agreement contained a different mechanism to “uphold 
the honour of the Crown”.55 By “mechanism” Binnie J. was really 
referring to the content of consultation and not to the existence of the 
obligation. In doing so, he expressly noted that territorial officials had to 
take fair and full consideration of the LSCFN’s views, they did not have 
to commit to minimize that concern.56 As between those two options, 
Binnie J. concluded that the review by the territorial officials had to be 
fair. Applying that principle to the particular facts, Binnie J. concluded 
that the notice that the LSCFN received through LARC, the opportunity 
that was offered to LSCFN to make its concerns known to the decision-
maker, and the manner in which the decision-maker acted, were all 
consistent with the honour of the Crown.  
(c)  Decision of Justice Deschamps 
As in Moses, Deschamps J.’s concern lay with the ability to preserve 
the integrity of the LSCFN agreement and to locate a solution to the 
consultation conundrum within confines of the agreement. In the result, 
many of her conclusions were similar to those reached by Binnie J. But 
her approach was very different. As she did in Moses, Deschamps J. 
began her analysis by taking a very close look at the LSCFN Treaty. She 
concluded that the LSCFN Treaty contained a consultation mechanism 
that was fully equipped to address the consultation concerns at hand. 
That mechanism was applied and its requirements were met. 
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In her broader analysis, Deschamps J. pointed to honour of the 
Crown principles and the expectation embedded within modern treaties 
that the treaty relationship would evolve as a function of its implementa-
tion. On the basis of that observation, she concluded that the primacy and 
integrity of the treaty had to be preserved when considering particular 
questions. She explained that both the honour of the Crown and the 
evolving requirement of the relationship were integral and operative 
dimensions of the negotiating process, such that the outcome of that 
process ought not, unless absolutely essential, to be modified or dis-
counted.  
Beginning with treaty-making, Deschamps J. noted that it was de-
signed to establish a relationship that would have the capacity to evolve 
over time. In the negotiations of that relationship, the Aboriginal people 
engaged in that process would have to be able to “participate actively in 
defining their special constitutional rights and for their autonomy of 
judgment”.57 The expectation that the treaty relationship would evolve 
imports with it the legal certainty of flexibility and therefore uncertainty, 
to enable the evolution to occur. Such an approach inevitably eclipses the 
concept of a finality clause. In the result, entire agreement clauses could 
not be equated with finality because that would pre-empt the capacity for 
evolution.  
In light of that approach, the Crown was precluded from taking a 
narrow interpretive approach that would have the effect of denying 
consultation. The spirit of the agreement would have to operate to locate 
a resolution to the dispute within the treaty terms.  
Complementing that analysis was the observation that the treaty-
making process was infused with the honour of the Crown principles and 
the desired objective of reconciliation.58 The Crown’s very act of 
negotiating and seeking to reach modern-day agreements that would 
enable Aboriginal communities to exercise their special rights in their 
traditional territories, reflected honourable Crown conduct. By extension, 
the outcome of such conduct had to be honourable. That being the case, 
its implementation could not then be undermined by permitting any one 
of the parties to resort to an external process that could enable it to 
renege on the obligations contained in the treaty.59 Instead, the parties 
would have to work together to locate a solution within the agreement. 
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Embedded in Deschamps J.’s approach was in some respects a direction 
along the lines of: “you all reached the agreement, now make it work.”  
Justice Deschamps was not oblivious to the fact that even the most 
thorough agreements might contain gaps. She acknowledged that treaties 
were not complete codes and that omissions might be identified after the 
agreement’s conclusion. Similarly, Deschamps J. acknowledged that 
when trying to give maximum credit and deference to the negotiating 
parties, the courts could not be oblivious to or “blinded” by the omis-
sions.60 Where true gaps or omissions were discovered, whether proce-
durally or substantially, the honour of the Crown and the common law 
obligations could be resorted to so as to locate a solution to the problem. 
But that possibility ought not to undermine the legal certainty of the 
treaty. Such instances should also be truly exceptional and not the rule.  
III. RECONCILIATION IN THE EYES OF THE COURT 
There are two issues that emerge from the Court’s recent pro-
nouncements that are essential to understanding the probable trajectory 
of Aboriginal jurisprudence. The first relates to the Court’s definition of 
reconciliation and its view of dialogue as the primary vehicle for recon-
ciliation. The second issue concerns the relationship between the objec-
tives of reconciliation, its constituent components and the grounding 
principles of the Constitution. The first issue underlies all three cases. 
The second is embedded in Rio Tinto but it lies at the heart of the debate 
between Binnie and Deschamps JJ. The two issues feed into each other 
and it is difficult to give priority to one over the other. Understanding the 
meaning and the objectives of reconciliation set up the discussion on 
how to fit those objectives into the Constitution. But clarifying the limits 
of the Constitution, or to be more precise, the limits within which the 
Constitution may be permitted to evolve to enable consultation, feeds 
into the question of which of the reconciliation objectives are feasible 
and which are not. That said, the discussion will proceed first with a 
review of the Court’s definition of reconciliation. It will then place that 
definition within the broader constitutional context to understand the 
possible future options in the direction of the relationship. 
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1.  What Does Reconciliation Mean and What Is it Intended to 
Accomplish? 
In many respects, Rio Tinto crystallized the Court’s jurisprudential 
direction and conception of what it considers to constitute reconciliation. 
This is not to say that the components of reconciliation were previously 
obscure. Beginning with R. v. Sparrow61 and working through to Delga-
muukw v. British Columbia,62 the question at issue was formulated in 
terms of “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies 
with the sovereignty of the Crown”.63 In Haida Nation, Taku River and 
Mikisew Cree, consultation and dialogue were presented as the primary 
tools to be used to achieve the proposed reconciliation.  
In Rio Tinto the Court moved to a practical translation of the frame-
work that it set up in the earlier cases to conclude that reconciliation, the 
honour of the Crown and consultation are about achieving a balance in 
the sharing and exploitation of the country’s resources. Behind those 
grand terms is the concern to “preserve the future use of the resources 
claimed by Aboriginal peoples while balancing the countervailing Crown 
interests”.64 The questions that are engaged by such a perspective and the 
balancing act that is contemplated are much less about whether the 
resources are to be exploited and significantly more about how they are 
to be exploited. Thus, the Court observed that consultation was not about 
shutting down development. Recognizing that consultation could cause 
delays in the ongoing development of the resources,65 that was accepted 
as a necessary outcome of a “complex constitutional process”.66 The 
further implication was that besides some minor delay, development 
would proceed. And as if anticipating some concerns with the proposed 
approach, the Court hastened to note that Aboriginal peoples are often 
involved in economic development and in the exploitation of resources.67 
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While a valid point, the further implication was that Aboriginal commu-
nities are just as interested in economic development. 
Arguably, the nature of the balance reflected in Rio Tinto is not all 
that new. In R. v. Marshall,68 for example, where access to the resources 
in the context of a treaty right to trade was at issue, the Court in effect 
alluded to a similar type of balance. In that instance, the underlying 
objective was to identify a way of striking a balance between the exercise 
of Aboriginal treaty rights to hunt, fish and trap and the rights acquired 
by the Crown to facilitate the settlement of the lands. The mechanism 
used in that case was to draw a distinction between commercial activities 
and activities for personal use. The promotion of economic development 
as the cornerstone of reconciliation in Rio Tinto may be reflecting a 
certain evolution in the Court’s reconciliation discourse. That implication 
raises a number of significant questions. 
(a)  Exploitation of the Resources as a Means to Reconciliation 
The first concern with the Court’s conception of reconciliation lies 
with the faith that it places on the parties’ ability to reconcile their 
relationship by negotiating and reaching agreements over the sharing of 
the resources. There is no question that economic self-sufficiency and 
participation in the Canadian resource economy by Aboriginal communi-
ties is a critical, if not an essential component of reconciliation, however 
narrowly or broadly reconciliation might be defined. It is also possible 
that the resource-focus and orientation of the Court in these three recent 
cases is being driven by the subject matter of the consultations at issue, 
such that there is limited scope for a fuller consideration of the various 
facets of reconciliation. However, resource exploitation, as the point of 
departure for the ultimate balancing objective, runs a significant risk of 
eclipsing a deeper understanding of how economic development fits in 
with a community’s values and overall well-being.  
To put this concern into a better perspective, it is essential to recog-
nize that Aboriginal peoples across the country have diverse perspectives 
and visions. Chief Justice McLachlin is correct to observe that there are 
Aboriginal peoples who participate in resource exploitation. But that is 
not necessarily a universal primary objective. For some communities, 
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greater access to their lands for the purposes of generating economic 
opportunities can be vitally important to their well-being. However, 
many communities and individuals see their very identity as inextricably 
connected to their land. Access to their traditional lands and their 
resources is understood in cultural and spiritual terms. Although taking 
some of the resource for economic benefit may not be precluded from 
consideration, how that might be done and how much of the resource 
might be removed or exploited may result in some significant tensions 
within communities and between individuals.69  
Such considerations can have a range of implications on the resource 
at issue depending on whether that is located on Aboriginal title lands or 
on treaty lands. For example, if the resource is located on Aboriginal title 
lands, the nature of the negotiation that the honour of the Crown and 
consultation obligations will require will necessarily be “deep”, with 
prospects in certain circumstances of a veto by the title-holding commu-
nity. In treaty territory the notion that Aboriginal treaty rights holders 
maintain a right to engage as before in their usual avocations of hunting, 
fishing, harvesting and trapping, may very possibly import internal 
practices and ways of engaging with the resource, or access to the 
resource for long-term objectives. Thus in many customary practices, the 
internal limit on a resource is defined by the imperative that individuals 
take only as much as is absolutely needed for subsistence. Development 
practices and objectives that seek to remove resources for commercial 
purposes are very likely to exceed the quantum that would be accepted 
by traditional practices. In such an instance, the economics of the 
situation, coupled with negotiated agreements, makes reconciliation a 
very different task. Then, of course, there may well be the situation 
where an Aboriginal community decides that it would like to capitalize 
on its resources on its title lands for commercial purposes but such 
practices might otherwise be contrary to environmental and other related 
Crown concerns. The balancing in that instance will be of a different 
nature but the economic self-sufficiency that a community might be 
seeking to undertake may not be received in reconciliatory terms if it 
brings it into conflict with its neighbours. 
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Overriding this dilemma is a question of whether the emphasis on 
economic participation, economic self-sufficiency and economic well-
being on a Western economic platform does not risk the integration of 
Aboriginal practices into Western economic norms that eventually may 
result in the trivializing of traditional values and the reduction of cus-
tomary practices to symbolic festivals and the eventual transformation of 
the landscape.70 This is not to say that negotiated agreements have to take 
that direction. However, in the context of difficult economic times and 
the increasing demands on Canada’s resources, challenges to practices 
and perspectives that have the effect of restricting access to the resources 
that are otherwise in demand might become quite pronounced and the 
desired balancing a difficult goal to achieve.  
(b)  Economic Self-sufficiency as a Proxy for All Other Elements of 
Reconciliation  
Unless the significant deficits in the socio-cultural aspects of the 
Aboriginal-Crown relationship are addressed, placing economic devel-
opment and the sharing and the exploitation of resources at the heart of 
reconciliation carries with it the significant risk that consultation, as the 
primary vehicle for reconciliation, will be used as a proxy for the 
settlement of all other social and jurisdictional dimensions of the Abo-
riginal-Crown relationship. That possibility is not theoretical. It is an 
issue that underlines many consultations that are taking place across the 
country. The net effect is to take parties down one of two or three paths. 
Where parties want to avoid legal disputes, the accommodation require-
ments may be amplified and the terms of an accommodation agreement 
might be richer than might otherwise be required by the legal consulta-
tion obligation. Where parties cannot agree on accommodation terms, 
alternative dispute resolution methods (“ADR”) and/or court proceedings 
may be needed to arbitrate a settlement. This approach may facilitate an 
eventual negotiation. But it might also result in a wider divide with 
difficult court orders and implications. 
The reason for this dynamic is that as much as the grand purpose of 
the section 35 right might be about reconciliation, the individual com-
munities, the individual government ministries, and the individual project 
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proponents, at the micro-level of the equation, have very defined objec-
tives, requirements and perspectives. In addition, what is a strategic 
decision-point for an Aboriginal community will be different than what it 
might be for a government or a company. Though the decision-point at 
issue might, for example, be a licence renewal, for an Aboriginal commu-
nity the cumulative effects of a proposed project underlying a very focused 
application may be a crucial component of the consultation. Viewed that 
way, the Aboriginal community may assess its strategic decisions from the 
perspective of maximizing its leverage in the consultations. In contrast, the 
requirements of an Aboriginal community on a particular company may 
exceed that company’s capacity to address anything more than the immedi-
ate impacts of a proposed project. The actual impacts of the particular 
activity, severed from longer-term or cumulative effects, may also be 
minimal, placing consultation at the low end of the spectrum. Such a reality 
makes it that much more difficult to justify demands for accommodations 
that would be more appropriate in the context of more pronounced impacts 
and deeper consultation requirements.  
Adding government to the mix, the range of public interest considera-
tions and the assessment of what are strategic decision-making points 
may vary significantly. Consultation and accommodation options may 
also be limited by the legislative parameters that are engaged. For 
example, if the real obstacle or community challenge concerns problems 
with education or health care, the accommodation options from the 
perspective of a resource ministry or even the government may be 
limited by jurisdictional limits. Accommodations at that level would 
necessarily transcend the demands of any one particular project or 
consultation. 
The three cases reflect some appreciation of the noted dynamics and 
associated risks. Thus, McLachlin C.J.C. tried to contain consultation to 
the actual potential for impacts of current government conduct and to 
strategic decision-making. The latter referred to changes in the way that a 
resource might be managed that would set the stage for further decisions 
“that will have a direct adverse impact on land and resources”.71 Al-
though McLachlin C.J.C. promoted a generous and purposive approach 
to the subject of Crown conduct and its impact on Aboriginal claims or 
rights,72 she also cautioned that adverse impacts would be limited to a 
current decision and do not “extend to adverse impacts on the negotiating 
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position of an Aboriginal group”.73 While that approach identifies some 
parameters to particular consultation interactions, from the perspective of 
paving the way to reconciliation, they do not necessarily assist with the 
broader socio-economic challenges facing Aboriginal communities 
across the country. Addressing the well-being of Aboriginal communi-
ties, and starting with basic aspects such as access to clean water, hazard-
free housing, the availability of proper education and health facilities, 
and perhaps most significantly, the restoration of self-worth and confi-
dence of Aboriginal people in the Constitution, are all foundational to the 
promotion of successful economic development. If these priorities are 
treated as secondary to economic priorities, the pressure on consultation 
and accommodation will be enormous. More significantly, consultation 
and accommodation as tools of reconciliation are unlikely to be able to 
respond to the broader socioeconomic needs. 
(c)  Upgrading the Status Quo 
The third implication of the Court’s approach to consultation and 
reconciliation touches on the nature of the balance that is to be achieved 
between the resources claimed by Aboriginal peoples and the counter-
vailing Crown interests. This concern is trickier to analyze in the context 
of the three decisions because in two of the three cases, even the Abo-
riginal parties acknowledged that their existing rights were not going to 
be affected by the particular decisions at issue. Furthermore, the results 
in both Rio Tinto and in Little Salmon were the appropriate outcomes. 
The balance to be achieved between the farming activities with a 
potential impact on one-third of one per cent of the whole trapline, 
especially when that trapline covered an area of 21,435 hectares, was 
obvious. Similarly, what might be achieved by imposing onerous 
consultation obligations in the context of Rio Tinto was not clear. The 
particular facts aside, the analysis of consultation and the Court’s 
approach on consultation suggests that the Court does not view that 
process as amounting to more than some inconvenience for the parties 
involved. In that sense, it is not clear that the Court is promoting more 
profound changes to the status quo. 
The hope appears to be that consultation and accommodation will 
promote better relations, that economic development and gradual self-
sufficiency will foster greater trust, and that working together will 
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eventually result in a meaningful paradigm shift that is acceptable to all 
and that does not amount to zero-sum propositions and outcomes.  
The optimism for such a perspective grows out of a view of the Con-
stitution as a living tree, supported by principles, including dialogue, that 
are intended to promote the evolution of constitutional relations.74 The 
Court in that respect has been very careful to set up the appropriate legal 
framework for future consultations interaction, but then to leave it to the 
parties to work within the proposed framework to achieve mutually 
satisfactory outcomes. That explains the Court’s application of a reason-
able standard to the review of the actual consultation deliberations75 and 
Binnie J.’s indication that a satisfactory consultation outcome would be 
one that emerged from a reasonable range of options.76 But if the 
cumulative effect of consultations does not accomplish a meaningful 
rebalancing of the relationship, there is a risk that history might not judge 
reconciliation, consultation and accommodation in favourable terms.  
(d)  But What Does Reconciliation Really Mean? 
If reconciliation is more than the economic sharing of resources, if it 
engages other aspects of the Aboriginal-Crown relationship and if the 
ultimate objective of reconciliation is to promote new but meaningful 
and respectful ways in that relationship, what does that really look like? 
As noted above, the legal concept of reconciliation in the Aboriginal 
jurisprudence has been evolving for some time. It is a notion that has also 
gained substantial prominence in international crises and the resolution 
of such impasses. Reconciliation initiatives have been pursued in 
Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Uganda and, perhaps most 
prominently, South Africa. In the latter instance the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission (“TRC”) was set up in the aftermath of South 
Africa’s political transition. Its overriding task was to manage a complex 
and delicate relationship between sensitive yet public concerns. Embed-
ded in that dynamic was the need to address the relationships between 
accommodation of justice and peace, of human rights and reconciliation, 
of victims’ rights and perpetrator demands, and of legal processes and 
                                                                                                             
74  See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 
(S.C.C.) for a full discussion of the Court’s approach to the Constitution. Also see E. Ria Tzimas, 
“Haida Nation and Taku River: A Commentary on Aboriginal Consultation and Reconciliation” in 
Jamie Cameron, Patrick Monahan & Bruce Ryder, eds. (2009) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 461. 
75  See Haida Nation, supra, note 2, at paras. 60-63; Rio Tinto, supra, note 5, at paras. 64-65. 
76  Little Salmon, supra, note 6, at para. 38. 
520 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
extrajudicial truth-seeking mechanisms.77 As the TRC proceeded with its 
task, it had to engage in a balancing of the rights of the apartheid victims 
in “acceptable ways while at the same time keeping perpetrators on 
board”.78 In the result, there was a widespread recognition that justice 
and reconciliation were complementary and that one without the other 
would be detrimental to both. Justice was required to promote equitable 
relations. Reconciliation was required to put an end to endless cycles of 
recrimination and punishment. Together, each of those concepts provided 
the parameters for the legitimate use of the other. 
Speaking more broadly, what emerges out of the case studies of the 
various attempts at reconciliation are three critical components that have 
to be understood and settled before reconciliation can be set as an 
objective. The first component concerns the definition of reconciliation. 
The concept can mean different things to different people. However, at 
its core, reconciliation is about rebuilding relationships of trust and 
cohesion.  
The second component of reconciliation relates to its process. This is 
perhaps the most challenging to define because the development of a 
process is likely to shape the outcomes. Generally speaking, the process 
of reconciliation may be understood as a series of steps that ought to be 
taken to achieve the desired goals. Practically, the experience to date with 
reconciliation processes has resulted in the identification of five inter-
woven and related strands:79  
(1)  Accepting a vision of a shared future: This imports the recognition 
of a common vision of an interdependent, just, equitable, open and 
diverse society as the ultimate objective of reconciliation. 
(2)  Acknowledging the past: The losses, the indignities and the suffering 
of the past have to be recognized and healing processes have to be 
identified. Individuals and institutions have to acknowledge their 
own role in the past. But they also have to accept past conduct as the 
cause of the harm, learn from those experiences and seek construc-
tive ways of avoiding the repetition of past mistakes.80 Similarly, 
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“victims” have to be receptive to the expressions of regret and heal-
ing. They must also have a significant role in giving expression to 
the ways of the future.81 
(3)  Re-building the relationship: This part of the process requires that 
the parties confront issues of trust, prejudice and intolerance. It also 
requires parties to recognize both their similarities and their differ-
ences. This part of the process requires time and place so that the 
redressing of the wrongs can be connected to the creation of a com-
mon and connected future.  
(4)  Changing cultural understandings and attitudes: This part of the 
process goes beyond the recognition of past wrongs to an under-
standing of why the relationship collapsed in the first place. Parties 
must work away from a culture of suspicion, mistrust and fear and 
move towards understanding and openness. To hear and to be heard 
as part of the reconciliation process becomes key.  
(5)  Substantial social, economic and political change: Ultimately, the 
aspects of social, economic and political structures that resulted in 
division and conflict must be identified, redefined and transformed 
in ways that avoid the repetition of past wrongs.  
In sum, designing an appropriate process and identifying the interaction 
between its various components is not an easy task. More significantly, it 
requires time and transition.  
The third component of reconciliation requires an understanding of 
where reconciliation is to take place and how it is to operate. Some 
position this part of the discourse at an institutional level. On that view, 
                                                                                                             
reconciliation: moral reflection, repentance, confession and rebirth. Confronting the wrong, 
expressing regret and seeking an apology requires significant moral fortitude. Nobody wants to do 
wrong. When wrong happens it requires tremendous courage to admit to that wrong. But that is only 
one dimension of the problem. The more difficult part of the exercise is to figure out how to avoid 
mistakes and wrongs in the future. Reconciliation, conceived as a rebirth, captures the essence of 
embarking on new ways.  
81  At some point in the reconciliation exchange, the perpetrator, who genuinely regrets the 
injurious actions and seeks ways of moving forward, will experience the rebirth. In the face of 
genuine regret, the victim’s refusal to engage in the process perpetuates the hurt and prevents the 
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(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) (“RCAP”), the Commission concluded that it was 
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peoples to be aboriginal” and the negotiation of a treaty model. See in particular Partners in 
Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government and the Constitution (Ottawa: The Commis-
sion, 1993), at 41. 
522 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
the collective conscience has to adapt and accept the way towards a 
transformed relationship. As agents of change, the institutions of gov-
ernment must strive to bring about reconciliation through truth commis-
sions, justice and social reform.82 Others locate reconciliation at the level 
of individuals and the grass-roots. Advocates of that approach see individ-
ual practices and interactions as the better way of effecting change. 
Community-building, social cohesion, social processes and the nurturing 
of renewed relationships at the individual level stand a better chance of 
informing corporate processes and contributing to a political reconcilia-
tion. By extension, the building of momentum through many individual 
experiences can bring about a mutually acceptable paradigm shift.  
Taken as a whole, where do these considerations take section 35’s 
grand purpose of reconciliation? The short answer is that as a vision, it 
identifies the imperative of defining and recapturing an honourable 
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal communities. It also 
identifies some of the tools that are to effect reconciliation. Whether the 
process is institutionally or individually driven (or a bit of both), the 
Court is correct to observe that such changes will occur through dia-
logue. Insofar as the cases before the Court concern access to, sharing 
and extraction of resources, the Court’s focus on economic self-
sufficiency is not wrong. Wealth creation has a significant role to play in 
the renewing of the relationship. In certain respects, it may be perceived 
as the easiest short-term solution to the tremendous inequities and it may 
help to promote a levelling of the playing field. However, on its own, 
economic self-sufficiency will limit the ability to speak of real socio-
political change that would give Aboriginal communities a desired voice 
in shaping their future participation and place in the Constitution. The 
relationship of a socio-political transformation to the task of reconcilia-
tion, the type of changes that would effect the transformation and the 
congruence of such transformation with the Constitution is the harder 
issue to address. The tensions of that discourse are what emerge in the 
dialogue between Binnie J. and Deschamps J.  
2.  What About the Idea of One Canoe? 
Will a mutually respectful relationship, the grand purpose of section 
35, emerge through dialogue and recourse to section 35 consultation 
obligations, or will it emerge through the negotiation of modern treaties? 
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Will reconciliation be achieved through a myriad of individual interac-
tions and consultations, or will it require more fundamental changes? If it 
is the latter, can such changes be accomplished within the existing 
constitutional framework or do they require a different approach?  
These are the questions broadly speaking that underpin both the 
components of reconciliation discussed above and the “Binnie J. – 
Deschamps J.” dialogue. Both judges have faith in the Constitution and 
are confident in their views that reconciliation can occur within the 
parameters of the Constitution. Their differences lie in the way they 
conceive of the process of reconciliation and the locus of that transfor-
mation. In short, for Binnie J., dialogue and section 35 obligations at the 
individual level are the elements that will promote reconciliation. For 
Deschamps J., modern treaties where Aboriginal parties give expression 
to their autonomy of judgment is the key to reconciliation. This latter 
perspective engages the broader question of whether the autonomy of 
agreement-making improves the prospects of a more substantial constitu-
tional transformation and reconciliation. 
Beginning with the definition of reconciliation, Binnie J.’s definition 
grows out of a view that section 35 ushered in the concept of a merged 
sovereignty where “aboriginal and non-aboriginal Canadians together 
form a sovereign entity with a measure of common purpose and united 
effort”.83 That concept was first introduced in the Aboriginal-Crown 
discourse in the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peo-
ples.84 Building on that idea and seeking to give it meaning, Binnie J. 
explained in Mitchell85 that as a new entity, the shared sovereignty had to 
have the capacity to reconcile the historical attributes of sovereignty with 
existing Aboriginal and treaty rights. Quoting RCAP’s view of shared 
sovereignty as a hallmark of the Canadian federation, and a central 
feature of the three-cornered relations linking Aboriginal governments, 
provincial governments and the federal government together, Binnie J. 
likened that relationship to the image of a single vessel. He explained 
that much like the three historic elements of wood, iron and canvas were 
pulled to form a harmonious whole, so too, the three historic elements of 
the Canadian federation — the Aboriginal governments, the provincial 
governments and the federal government — ought to be understood to 
form a harmonious partnership. Within that partnership each would retain 
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its respective spheres and powers by virtue of its constitutional status. 
But together they could find ways to share their powers. In short, there 
was no need to look for a different vessel because as partners, the three 
entities forming the shared sovereignty would work together to find an 
appropriate balance, to build trust and to maintain a cohesive whole.  
Justice Deschamps also expressed confidence in the Constitution and 
accepted that as the foundation for the definition of reconciliation. She 
came to that conclusion by pointing to the reconciliation that occurs 
among the compacts that are contained within the Constitution. Relying 
on the analysis contained in the Reference re Secession of Quebec,86 
Deschamps J. drew attention to the four principles underlying the 
Constitution: (1) constitutionalism and the rule of law; (2) democracy; 
(3) respect for minority rights; and (4) federalism. She then added a fifth 
principle to the Constitution: the honour of the Crown. Examining the 
original four principles, Deschamps J. noted that they contained three 
compacts: (1) between the Crown and individuals insofar as fundamental 
rights and freedoms are concerned; (2) between the non-Aboriginal and 
Aboriginal populations; and (3) among the provinces. Combined with the 
honour of the Crown, these principles and compacts, in Deschamps J.’s 
view created the space for a harmonious co-existence of the rights of 
Aboriginal peoples within the Constitution’s organizing principles.87 In 
reconciliation terms, the Constitution provides all the scope that would 
be needed to promote trust and cohesion.  
The two judges part company on the second and the third compo-
nents of reconciliation, that is, the process and the focus of reconcilia-
tion. Beginning with process, both judges accepted that the negotiation of 
a treaty offers the parties the optimal opportunity to work out a relation-
ship that integrates and incorporates the special rights and perspectives of 
the negotiating parties. The very purpose of such a negotiation — to find 
a better way — carries with it the processes that are needed to overcome 
a culture of suspicion, mistrust and fear. Whether from the perspective of 
a robust Canadian federation, as reflected in the image of a canoe/vessel, 
or from the perspective of the Constitution’s compacts, the process of 
negotiating a new relationship embraces many of the principles of 
reconciliation. The place for Aboriginal peoples to participate in defining 
their special constitutional rights and to exercise their autonomy of 
judgment is in the negotiation of modern treaties.  
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Implicit in the faith that Deschamps J. placed in the negotiation 
process was the sense that the very act of negotiating captures four or 
five critical ingredients of reconciliation, namely: mutual recognition as 
equal, co-existing and self-governing peoples through their many 
relations together, mutual respect, mutual sharing and mutual responsibil-
ity.88 Thus in both Little Salmon and Moses, Deschamps J.’s focus was on 
preserving the integrity of those agreements and the processes underpin-
ning the outcomes. Substantial transformation can occur and Aboriginal 
communities can exercise their autonomy in judgment within the existing 
principles of the Constitution through the negotiation and implementa-
tion of modern agreements. She concedes that where there are true gaps 
to an agreement the parties may seek recourse to honour of the Crown 
principles and section 35 obligations for a solution. However, such 
recourse should be the exception. Moreover, it would appear that 
Deschamps J. would not look favourably on agreements that compro-
mised the constitutional pillars.  
In contrast to Deschamps J., implicit in the caution with which Bin-
nie J. approached the JBNQA and the LSCFNA was perhaps the concern 
that if the process of negotiating reconciliation were to go so far as to 
begin to reshape questions of jurisdiction and the division of powers, 
they would likely require formal constitutional amendments before their 
terms could be implemented.  
That concern might explain how Binnie J. approached the reconcilia-
tion process. In both Moses and Little Salmon, Binnie J. placed signifi-
cant emphasis on the need to create a legal basis for a long-term positive 
relationship. His reference to the canoeist looking forward to make 
progress resurrected the image of the vessel in Mitchell and with that the 
reminder that Aboriginal communities, the provinces and the federal 
government can share harmoniously in the relationship, but within their 
respective spheres of jurisdiction. References to the past and the future, 
with particular emphasis on the future, is consistent with the process 
features of reconciliation discussed above. The challenging part of 
Binnie J.’s approach lies with the limitation he places on the parties’ 
respective spheres of jurisdiction. While some might see that as the protec-
tion that is needed to prevent the erosion of fundamental constitutional 
values, others might question whether the net effect on reconciliation is to 
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limit the scope for transformation in the Aboriginal-Crown relationship. 
This concern is compounded by Binnie J.’s downgrading, in effect, of the 
JBNQA assessment procedure. Although in context, the added layer of 
review through the CEAA might be accepted as an added layer of 
protection for the section 35 rights of the Cree, the implication of such 
downgrading carried with it a devaluation of Cree participation because 
the CEAA does not contemplate nearly the type of Cree participation in 
its process that is contained in the JBNQA.  
Complementing the differences in approaches to the reconciliation 
process between Binnie J. and Deschamps J. are their different views on 
how and where reconciliation is to take place. Justice Binnie’s focus on 
dialogue as the primary reconciliation tool locates consultation at the 
local level of interaction. His conclusion that a significant part of 
reconciliation can be realized through the “thoughtful administration of 
the treaty”89 and the generous interpretation of the treaty terms by 
government officials, locates much of the responsibility for reconciliation 
at the local and individual level. The implication of that approach is that 
individual successes and experience will drive corporate or collective 
change and transformation. Stated in different terms, the trust will grow 
out of individual consultations and interactions.  
By contrast, Deschamps J.’s treatment and consideration of the mod-
ern-day agreements as agents of reconciliation locates that process at the 
broader collective level of engagement. In Deschamps J.’s vision the 
modern-day treaties are about achieving collective change. While 
dialogue is a significant component of the process, the generosity in the 
interpretation of modern treaties is not seen to emanate merely from the 
administration of the treaty by individual officials. Rather, its implemen-
tation in a generous way grows out of the collective intention to create a 
new relationship through the modern agreement. Thus, individual 
conduct in the implementation of particular agreements is to be guided 
by the collective direction reflected in the agreement.  
The locus of agency in the reconciliation process likely lies some-
where in the middle between individual experiences and implementation 
and the direction of the collective will. The pillars of the Constitution, as 
enumerated in the Secession Reference, and applied by Deschamps J., 
serve to ground the legal basis for the much sought after long-term 
relationship between non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal communities. 
However, this consideration, perhaps more so than the definitional and 
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process aspects of reconciliation, brings into focus the broader realization 
that some aspects of reconciliation are legal in nature and engage princi-
ples of justice in a fundamental way. Other aspects engage broader socio-
political considerations and are arguably more challenging to address.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Justice Binnie said in Little Salmon that “[a] canoeist who hopes to 
make progress faces forwards, not backwards.”90 Few would disagree 
with the proposition that the recognition of past wrongs, the accommoda-
tion of differences and the envisioning of a common and connected 
future is a desired way forward. Canada, unlike other conflict-ridden 
jurisdictions, can draw on its rich sources of plural government, federal-
ism and mutual respect for cultural, legal and political diversity to 
achieve reconciliation. These experiences can operate to strengthen the 
Constitution and Confederation in ways that harmonize Aboriginal 
communities, provinces and the federal government. However, the 
resolve has to be there to give reconciliation its full expression and to 
appreciate its highly textured demands. In practical terms, that comes 
down to an analysis that transcends a strictly legal debate but goes back 
to some fundamental questions over what Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
Canadians alike would like to see in a future harmonized relationship. 
Without that resolve and that analysis there is a significant risk that 
reconciliation will become just another lofty term, discussed in terms of 
high generality and ambiguity, much in the way of the historic treaties. 
Surely, there has to be a better way forward.  
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